The Neural Bases of Theory of Mind in Bilinguals

Theory of Mind (ToM), or the ability to felicitously assign mental states to others, has previously exhibited sensitivity to individual differences in verbal memory, working memory, executive control, and bilingual status. Recent studies reveal that bilinguals reliably outperform monolinguals on false-belief (FB) tasks, a signature of ToM proficiency. It remains unknown (1) which neural processes underlie the advantaged performance of bilingual adults on ToM tasks and (2) whether distinct bilingual typologies differentially modulate said processes.

In the present study, Spanish-English heritage bilinguals (expected n = 30) and English monolinguals (expected n = 30) complete a belief reasoning task with concurrent EEG recording. Both event-related potentials and oscillations elicited during FB and true-belief (TB) trials will be comparatively analyzed. Results will be discussed considering individual differences of inhibitory control, resting-state EEG, metalinguistic awareness, language history, and personal social network. This study will shed light on how experiential and cognitive dimensions of bilingualism interact in the neural underpinnings of social competence and communication. (Presented at Psychonomics2024 and FPM2025)